Implications of Tax Administration for Tax Design: a Tentative Assessment by Arindam Das-Gupta
  1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications of Tax Administration for  
Tax Design: A Tentative Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arindam Das-Gupta∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ Professor, Goa Institute of Management, Ribandar, Goa 403006, INDIA 
   Email: oldmonk87@yahoo.com 
 
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
 
2
1. Introduction and overview 
 Richard Bird, recently made the following very perceptive comments about what 
economists know about tax administration1 
"We know very little about tax administration. 
 There is no “one size fits all” policy (OSFA). 
 “The devil is in the details”. 
 Implementation is as important as design. 
 Political will, support and non-interference in operations are indispensable 
prerequisites." 
 If his first observation is taken to mean "we probably know quite a bit about tax 
administration, but what we know is a small fraction of what we need to know", then 
these five observations taken together accurately describe the extent of knowledge and 
the likely scope at present for general propositions in the analysis of tax administration. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss major aspects of what is known about how tax 
administration influences tax design. The discussion draws on both theory and practice. 
Though empirical evidence is also examined where possible, its rarity in relation to tax 
administration implies that a lot of what is discussed in this paper is what we think we 
know, rather than what we can confidently say we do know.  The paper's tone is tentative 
and has become increasingly so during its writing. As a result, the discussion in this paper 
may equally well be seen as suggesting hypotheses as part of an agenda for theoretical 
research and rigorous empirical testing. 
 In section 2, working definitions of the terms "tax administration" and "tax 
design" are proposed. The position taken is inclusive, in that all but a small specified set 
of activities connected with raising tax revenues are taken to fit into either tax 
administration or tax design. Benchmarks for judging "good" tax administration and tax 
design are then briefly described.  
 This discussion serves as a backdrop to an examination of properties of tax 
administration and their implications for the design of taxes in section 3. These lessons or 
conjectures are termed "propositions", though they bear little relation to propositions in 
                                                 
1 In his introductory remarks on tax administration in the course " Practical Issues of Tax Policy and Tax 
Administration in Developing Countries" organized by the World Bank, March 22-25, 2004, New Delhi. 
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theoretical economics. After presenting three key insights about the impact of 
administration on the public budget and tax design, another 26 propositions are presented, 
and support for them from theory, evidence, and practice (and educated guesswork) are 
reviewed. These propositions are summarized in Annex 2. 
  Section 4 draws on the analysis of section 3 to attempt to identify important 
administrative constraints on the design of four major taxes and two cross-cutting areas 
of tax policy. In Section 5, bearing in mind Richard Bird's observations on the absence of 
"one-size-fits-all" administration rules and the importance of finer details, an attempt is 
made to identify sensible process features in designing administration friendly taxes. 
Section 6 points to some issues not covered in the paper and concludes with a plea for 
more research. 
 The paper focuses on how administration influences tax policy: It does not go into 
prescriptions on how tax administration effectiveness and efficiency can be increased 
through other institutional, incentive and management reforms. An illustrative selection 
of such reforms are stated in Annex 3. 
 
2. "Tax administration" and "tax design": working definitions 
 Imagine that in an economy alternative, economically costless, revenues became 
available to replace tax revenues. Compared to this situation, in principle, all activities, 
organizations and institutions in an economy that would not exist in the absence of taxes 
fall within the ambit of what may be termed the economy's tax system. 
 In simpler times, one can imagine a ruler of a country telling her soldiers "get me 
as much money or money's worth as you can from my subjects" (the tax design). Soldiers 
would then do the ruler's bidding (tax administration). Neither this tax design nor this tax 
administration would be acceptable in modern economies, if indeed such a tax system 
were feasible. Nevertheless this example captures the essence of what is encompassed in 
the elaborate tax systems of today. Anticipating the evaluation of tax systems below, this 
tax system has several problems: There is no relation between tax revenue and public 
expenditure, it does not (ex ante) satisfy Adam Smith's canon of "certainty", is potentially 
inequitable and distorting of resource allocation including investment, and leaves the tax 
administration with a great deal of discretion facilitating corruption. It also starkly 
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illustrates how tax simplification can be carried too far. Nevertheless, the tax system does 
have the virtue of administrative simplicity illustrating the pervasive trade-off in tax 
systems between economic efficiency and equity on one side and administrative 
simplicity on the other. 
 Compared to this system, the variety of activities which a modern economy's tax 
system encompasses can conceptually be divided into four sets: 
• First, defining normal and penal tax rates, tax bases, tax concessions, taxable 
entities, non-compliance penalties and the timing of tax payments. This is what is 
referred to here as tax design. Taxes so designed are formalized as laws of the 
land in tax laws proper, but also such things as bilateral tax treaties.  
• Second, the institutional process of translating a tax design into law, or what may 
be termed tax policy institutions. This covers activities such as public debate and 
discussion, executive branch tax proposals, legislative debate and legislating tax 
laws. Tax laws themselves are excluded. 
• Third, education and research related to tax systems, both in general and specific 
to a particular tax system. Included are such things as academic research and 
teaching and expert advice to governments. In the intersection between this and 
the previous set lie government appointed tax commissions. To prevent overlap 
with tax administration, educating taxable entities of their specific obligations to 
comply with tax laws, or what is commonly termed taxpayer education, and 
training government officials who collect taxes about tax laws and procedures are 
excluded. 
 All other activities within an economy's tax system are taken here to fall within 
the ambit of tax administration. Seen in this way, the scope of tax administration is quite 
large. A partial list of important components of tax administration is in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Important Components of Tax Administration (TA) 
Institutions and  organizations Role and function 
The "Tax Ministry" Monitor, forecast and set targets for tax revenue 
collection.  
Formulate administrative law which facilitate the 
implementation of tax law 
The Tax Department(s) (TDs) or 
tax administration in the narrow 
sense 
Facilitating and enforcing compliance by taxable 
entities with legislated tax laws.  
Key taxpayer related  activities include 
Identification of taxable entities, registration, 
information collection on tax bases with taxable 
entities, goods and asset valuation, physical checks and 
searches, investigation, tax liability determination, 
ensuring payment of tax dues, facilitating compliance 
via taxpayer education, taxpayer services and grievance 
redressal, administrative rulings, representation in tax 
disputes, enforcing compliance, imposing 
administrative sanctions in case of non-compliance. 
Key internal activities include 
Obtaining and deploying labour, capital and managerial 
resources, organising and motivating staff to administer 
tax laws, monitoring staff, appointing and coordinating 
agents in case of outsourced activities, sanctioning 
unauthorised conduct, reporting to the Minister, 
coordinating with other TDs (within the economy and 
in other economies). 
Independent audit, anti-corruption 
and (usually legislative) oversight 
bodies. 
Ensure that the TD discharges its functions in 
accordance with the law ("effectively") and at the 
lowest possible cost to society ("efficiently"). 
Agents and third parties to whom 
tax activities are outsourced (e.g. 
banks, tax withholders, tax 
farmers, tax form printers) 
Performing outsourced activities. 
Civil courts, arbitrators, tribunals Resolving disputes between TDs and taxpayers or third 
parties. 
Police and the criminal justice 
system 
Providing protection to TD staff. 
Legal proceedings and judicial sanctions in non-
compliance cases. 
Tax practitioners (preparers, 
accountants, tax lawyers), their 
associations and their 
organizations. 
Assisting taxpayers in complying with legal tax 
obligations and minimizing tax dues 
Representation in case of disputes. 
Legally taxable entities (including 
individuals) and their associations 
Complying with tax laws or undertaking activities to 
facilitate non-compliance. 
Associations: Coordinating with TDs, tax practitioners 
and tax policy institutions. 
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 This brief description of tax systems merits three immediate comments: First, 
there is much cross-country and historical diversity in each of the activity sets and TA 
components. Second, several components of tax systems, particularly of tax 
administration as defined here, have not been adequately analysed and studied. Third, 
there are no adequate estimates of the social cost of raising tax revenue (discussed further 
below). 
 Most, but not all, properties of TA discussed in this paper will pertain to TDs 
(Tax Departments) or "tax administration in the narrow sense", since this area has been 
most widely examined. 
 What features can be considered desirable and so used as benchmarks when 
examining tax design and TA? Ideally, a good tax system is one that is part of a welfare 
maximizing public budget. The standard optimal tax criterion that the tax system should 
minimises the welfare loss associated with raising a given amount of revenue is partial, in 
that it assumes that the expenditure side of the budget, and indeed the mix between tax 
and non-tax finance is already optimally determined. Since an adequate solution to this 
problem is not yet available, a number of rules of thumb are perforce used here, which 
are identified as they are used.2 Broadly, tax design features that increase the social cost 
of TA for raising a given amount of revenue (collection efficiency) or which constrain the 
ability of a TA to administer tax laws are identified as administratively undesirable and 
conversely. Related to the second criterion is the concept of TD effectiveness. The two 
dimensions of ineffectiveness are the extent to which actual revenue collected by the TD 
fall short of potential revenue per prevailing tax law (or the tax gap) and the extent of 
inequity across citizens due to TD procedures and administrative law. 
 
3. What we know or think we know 
 Before turning to the impact of the TA on tax design per se, its implications for 
the public budget are first pointed out. To do so, the evaluation framework of Slemrod 
                                                 
2 For example, Adam Smith’s canons of taxation of ‘Certainty’, ‘Convenience’, ‘Economy’, and ‘Equity’. 
Note that the first three relate directly or indirectly to TA costs. For optimal policy criteria encompassing 
the entire public budget see Atkinson and Stern (1974), Feldstein (1997) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(1996, 1998, 2002). 
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and Yitzhaki (1996, 1998, 2002) is used. The framework, already useful as an aid to 
conceptual thinking, has promise as a tool for empirical policy evaluation. 
3.1 Tax administration costs and the public sector 
Proposition 1: If TA costs increase, there should be less reliance on tax finance, less 
government expenditure or both. 
 Intuitively, at the margin, social costs of different sources of finance in the public 
budget, including non-tax revenues (user charges, fees, dividends and interest from 
government assets), debt and money finance, should be equated to minimize the total cost 
of financing public goods and services.  Furthermore, if the tax price of government 
provided goods and services increases, the optimal ratio of private goods to public goods 
should increase as well.3 
 These rules, but only for marginal changes in tax design and administrative 
procedures, are formalized in Mayshar (1991).4 A simple exposition of the Mayshar rules 
is in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998): Suppose the welfare function which the government 
seeks to maximize is V(U(E,w),G)), where U(.) is the indirect utility from private goods 
of citizens, w is the wage rate, G is the quantity of public goods and E is a vector of 
policy instruments used to raise finance for G. The optimum choice of G and E is given 
by MBF = MECFi, where MBF is the social marginal benefit from funds in terms of 
foregone private consumption and MECFi is the marginal efficiency cost of funds of the 
ith financing instrument. The MECF of the ith tax instrument incorporates TA costs.5 
This formula can also be used to examine specific tax design or TD procedures, not just 
tax and non-tax instruments. For example, Poapongsakorn et. al. (2000) apply the MECF 
                                                 
3 It should also be borne in mind that recent attempts to measure the excess burden of taxation suggest that 
these are much higher than earlier estimates suggest (Bird and Zolt, 2003), though this is addressed here. 
4 See also Atkinson and Stern (1974) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).  
5 Private sector costs and TD costs do not have additive effects on the MECF. The equation derived by 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) for the case where distribution is not taken account of is 
ii
iiii
i AMR
MRC)MRX(MECF −
++−γ= , where Xi is the potential increase in tax revenue if the tax base 
remained unchanged after the marginal increase in the ith tax instrument, MRi is the marginal revenue 
actually collected: (Xi – MRi) is therefore termed by them as the "leakage" out of the tax system. γ is a 
valuation parameter which will be above unity if taxpayer's optimal responses are constrained ("at a 
corner"), Ci is the marginal private sector compliance cost, and Ai is the marginal administrative cost – 
so that MRi – Ai is the net revenue raised. Distributional affects, both on the resource and expenditutre 
sides is incorporated in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). 
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framework to the evaluation of taxpayer surveys to discover non-filers in Thailand.6 They 
compare this to the benchmark alternative of raising tax rates proportionately in revenue 
neutral fashion.7 
3.2 The major implication for tax policy 
Proposition 2: Without taking into account administration costs, the efficiency cost and 
the equity impact of a real world tax system cannot be assessed. 
 This is uncontroversial. Nevertheless, some examples will make to scope of this 
proposition clearer.  
 The lump-sum tax, that essential benchmark in economic theory, is subject to 
lobbying costs.8 The nearest real-world equivalent, the poll tax, entails TD costs and, as 
illustrated by the Thatcher tax, additional resource costs stemming from taxpayer 
resistance and political instability. 
 In the presence of tax evasion and invoice fraud (evasion reflects imperfect 
enforcement capacity of a TD), intermediate inputs may continue to bear tax under a 
VAT so that production efficiency does not obtain.9 The extent of input taxation is 
directly dependent on the effectiveness of invoice-matching by the TD. 
As discussed below (in the section on tax farming), a taxing scheme which, in theory, 
greatly reduces TD costs and avoids the excess burden of taxes, may turn out to have 
little or no impact on TD costs when implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See also Fortin and Lacroix (1994) who analyse Canadian taxes. 
7 It would be of great interest to apply the MECF approach of Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996, 1998) to the 
choice between different financing instruments, to assess their relative desirability from a "public 
finance" perspective. While usable parameter estimates are not yet available, it is very likely that both Ai 
and Ci will be smaller for marginal increases in money or bond finance as compared to, say,  revenue 
from stepped up tax audits. 
8 Tollison?  reference? 
9 For a theoretical analysis, see Das-Gupta and Gang (2003). The analysis of international experience in 
Ebrill et. al. (2001) does not find clear evidence of growth benefits from the VAT, though this could be 
due to data limitations. 
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3.3 The key tax administration insight  
Proposition 3: Tax designs which economise on information requirements are least 
costly to administer. 
 The main functions of a TD and most of TA are concerned with information.10 
While information collection and interpretation are most important and most costly for 
administration, information storage, communication and dissemination is also 
necessary.11 Consequently, a leading hypothesis in the literature, that has appeared 
repeatedly in different guises, is that tax designs which economise on information 
requirements are simplest to administer.12 The implications of this for tax design, 
particularly for developing countries, are widely accepted and are part of the standard 
advice package given to most governments: 
 "A tax system with few taxes, a limited number of rates for each tax, limited 
exemptions, and a broad base has proven, in the context of many developing countries, to 
be much easier to administer and to result in higher compliance levels than a complex tax 
system". (Silvani and Baer, 1997, emphasis added).13 
 It is worth examining these design features in relation to their information 
conserving properties.  
 Information economies achieved from few taxes not only assist TA, but also make 
effective tax incidence on different goods or entities easier to determine and so facilitate 
                                                 
10 This hypothesis has been put forward repeatedly in the literature. For a recent example, see Bird 
(forthcoming). Or consider Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998): "An important set of generic aspects of income 
tax structure, non-taxation of imputed rents of consumer durables, taxation of capital gains (if at all) on a 
realization basis, and pre-set depreciation schedules, are undoubtedly largely driven by practical 
concerns of administratability."  
11 As Lasheras and Herrera (1991) put it, costs increase if more information needs to be collected, used and 
stored, not if more revenue needs to be collected. 
12 This does not justify the neglect of necessary information. For example, tax return form simplification 
achieved by drastically reducing their information content will reduce the accuracy of tax determination 
by the TD.  However neither does this condone the collection of excessive information, usually a much 
more serious problem (see Bird forthcoming). 
13 Or consider Wallschutzky (1989) as quoted in Bird (forthcoming): Keep the tax laws as simple as 
possible; - Aim for a global tax with few exemptions, credits, rebates, or deductions; - Do not try to use 
the tax system to achieve too many social and economic goals; - Continually monitor the tax system; - 
Concentrate on basic tasks such as collection of tax at source and an ID number system; - Do not collect 
more information than can be processed; — Actively encourage good record keeping; and — Aim, as a 
long term goal, for self-assessment” (emphasis added). Additional references are cited in Bird 
(forthcoming). 
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tax designs with limited economic efficiency and equity costs in addition to directly 
lowering TA costs.14 
 Few rates of tax, in the case of taxes on goods, reduce the possibility of non-
compliance through misclassification. While no misclassification is possible with a single 
tax rate, with N tax rates there are 
2
)1N(N − ways to misclassify goods subject to a high tax 
rate as goods subject to lower tax rates. This increases the information verification burden 
of a TD for tax determination.15 
 Few exemptions also limit the number of effective tax rates and the need to verify, 
case-by-case, compliance with the conditions under which exemptions are granted. 
The rationale for broad bases comes from the indirect information saving due to lower 
non-compliance opportunities and incentives. With few exclusions from the tax base, tax 
evasion or avoidance by claiming to belong to an excluded category becomes harder. 
Furthermore, for a given revenue requirement, tax rates can be lower than is the case with 
a narrow tax base.16 This reduces the incentive not to comply, as expected gains from 
non-compliance are directly related to the tax thereby saved. Both reduced non-
compliance and the likely positive impact on the tax base due to lower economic 
efficiency costs from low tax rates, lead to secondary, reinforcing, base effects. 
 Nevertheless, where there is a conflict between information economies and the 
"standard advice", exceptions arise.  For example, for a global income tax, information is 
needed more to verify the tax base (income), than to verify the applicable tax rate. In fact, 
when it is possible and cheaper to outsource tax determination and collection via tax 
withholding, information needs of the TD and overall tax collection costs can be reduced 
by instituting final withholding taxes. This fragments the tax base, making it schedular, 
and goes contrary to the standard advice of few taxes. Furthermore, if gross payments and 
net income from each source differ, multiple effective rates of tax become likely even 
with a common withholding tax rate. There is, inevitably, a caveat to this caveat: 
                                                 
14 A recent government commission in the state of Karnataka in India determined that the number of 
commodity tax rates on different goods, due to multiple levies and differing bases, was potentially 
infinite! See Finance Department, Government of Karnataka (2001). 
15 For a recent evaluation of the impact of misclassification on customs revenue, see Fisman and Wei 
(2004). 
16 Unless tax rates with a broad base are inefficiently high being beyond the rate(s) at which the Laffer 
curve peaks. 
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progressive income tax rates create the incentive to split taxable entities below their 
economically efficient or least cost size, a problem that arises in the case of 
unincorporated business firms in some countries. 
 The implication of administration cost saving due to information economies is a 
"pervasive trade-off between accuracy and cost of complexity".17 The inadequate 
recognition to date of costly information in optimal tax theory is possibly an important 
reason for optimal tax prescriptions in the literature continuing to be, by and large, 
without practical appeal. 
3.4 Information and basic tax administration 
Proposition 4: TD costs decrease with presumptions. 
 This follows from the information economies achieved by presumptions and 
presumptive taxes. Presumptions are pervasive in tax designs even in developed 
countries, via tax depreciation schedules, fixed schedules for entertainment deductions 
and ceilings or fixed allowances for other deductions. Alternative minimum tax regimes 
for corporations (see Tanzi and Sadka, 1993) and turnover based simplified tax regimes 
in lieu of the VAT for small firms, are other examples.  
 The selective use of presumptions is unavoidable if taxes are to be 
administratively feasible. Two criteria can be suggested for replacing "normal" tax laws 
by presumptions: First, other things equal, presumptions are more likely to be efficient 
the higher is the TA's (not just TD's) cost of information to determine or verify normal 
taxes and the lower are the social losses due to equity and efficiency costs. Examples are 
depreciation schedules, informal or farm sector value added and prices of imports. 
Second, presumptions that can be used immediately are more likely to be desirable on 
revenue ground if normal tax determination procedures require information not 
immediately available and if the TDs future ability to collect tax from the entity is 
uncertain. Examples are on-the-spot fines and final withholding taxes. 
 For presumptive taxes which substitute for "normal" taxes, a key design issue is 
the alternative tax base on which presumptions are to be based: The base(s) for 
presumptive taxes should ideally be closely correlated with the normal tax base, but 
                                                 
17  Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998). Tax complexity is discussed below. 
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should, at the same time, be relatively immutable and not subject to manipulation or 
concealment from the TD by taxpayers. For example, profession or sector of operation, 
location, physical business assets and how old the business is can together serve as a joint 
proxy for income.18  
Proposition 5:  Effectiveness in low capacity TDs is increased by selectively exempting 
the hard-to-tax, including the informal sector, from normal tax compliance 
obligations.  
 Intuitively, large resource expenditure by the TD chasing after meagre revenue 
gains if it attempts to verify the, typically unrecorded or poorly recorded, income, sales or 
other tax base of the hard-to-tax cannot be optimal.19 Theoretical support for this position 
is in McLaren (1998).20 Practical advice to deal with the hard-to-tax suggests the use of 
presumptive taxes, particularly in less developed countries with large informal sectors.21 
The same is true of self-employed professional, who are among the hard-to-tax in the 
formal sector.  
Proposition 6: TA procedures (withholding and advance tax) can increase 
administration effectiveness and efficiency. 
 Both tax withholding and advance taxes according to a laid down advance tax rate 
schedule have been found to have revenue benefits, while lowering tax collection costs 
and so are to be strongly advocated unless horizontal and inter-sectoral equity violations  
outweigh TA benefits. 
Of different privatized activities, evidence suggests that most important for TA 
effectiveness is tax withholding.22 Besides increasing compliance in general, tax 
                                                 
18 This was the rationale of the Israeli tahshiv. See Tanzi and Casanegra de Jantscher (1987) and Rajaraman 
(1995) for discussion and evaluation of this and other presumptive tax schemes. 
19 However, Terpker (2003) points to an inevitable caveat: Resources expended to tax the hard-to-tax may 
optimally be more than pure revenue and efficiency considerations dictate, if tax morale or compliance 
by others is adversely affected by the existence of lightly taxed sectors. Such inefficient use of resources 
is less costly in developed countries which have smaller proportions of hard-to-tax taxpayers according 
to preliminary evidence in Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003). 
20 Complete exemption of the informal sector is found to be optimal, in some cases, for low capacity TDs in 
McLaren (1998). In the model he constructs, capacity is measured by the number of audits a tax 
inspector can conduct. One of two optimal commodity tax designs, given identical households, evasion 
and endogenous black markets is a zero tax rate on black market sales. This is due to enforcement costs 
being intrinsically non-convex in his model. 
21 For  recent reviews see Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) and Terpker (2003).  
22 Evasion of taxes by individuals who have taxes withheld has been found to be lowest among different 
groups in the Taxpayer Compliance and Monitoring Surveys conducted periodically by the United States 
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withholding may be the only way to collect at least some taxes from small non-resident 
taxpayers and from "ghosts" who do not file returns and who have not been identified by 
the TD. 
 The compliance increasing property of advance tax payments has been 
empirically supported by studies of the United States and some European countries.23  
Proposition 7: TD costs decrease with concentration of the tax base across entities  
Figure 1: Tax Collection costs and per capita GSDP in major 
Indian states, 1985/86-2001/02  (3-year moving averages)
Log Per Capita GSDP
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 Direct evidence for tax base characteristics which reduce TD costs is difficult to 
come by. Differences in government accounting conventions make TD cost data across 
                                                                                                                                                 
Internal Revenue Service. See, for example, Kamdar (1995) and Slemrod and Bakija (1996). For indirect 
evidence see the discussion of the "balance due effect" in Jouljaian and Rider (1998) and references cited 
there. For theoretical analysis of withholding, including evasion out of withheld taxes, see Yaniv (1988, 
1998) and Das-Gupta (2004). 
23 See Yaniv (1999) and the reference cited there. Yaniv (1999) seeks to explain this finding using the 
prospect theory hypothesis. In particular, non-rational taxpayers who have had to pay advance taxes 
according to schedules laid down in the tax law are assumed to focus on "out-of-pocket" gains at the 
time of filing. 
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jurisdictions non-comparable.24 Even if cost data could be made comparable, differences 
in tax mixes and individual tax designs would still pose a problem.25 Given common 
budget accounting rules in Indian states and broadly similar tax structures, data on 
collection costs and its correlates for the 14 major Indian states for fiscal years 1985/86 to 
2000/01 may shed some light on the question.26 In Figure 1, collection costs as a 
percentage of own tax revenue of states is graphed against Gross State Domestic Product 
(GSDP) per capita (different colours are used for different states). The graph suggests a 
systematic association between the two variables.27 This accords with intuition, which 
suggests that administration costs would increase with the number of taxpayers rather 
than taxes per se, a point made by Lasheras and Herrera (1991). 
 Other tax base characteristics which should tend to reduce TD collection costs as 
a ratio of tax collected are population density (or state area and population), urbanization, 
literacy, and a lower sectoral share of agriculture and possibly a higher share of 
manufacturing. In regression experiments, higher literacy rates did not appear to increase 
collection efficiency. While this preliminary statistical evidence (Annex 1) is not 
conclusive, all the other variables appear to be statistically associated with increased 
collection efficiency.28 
                                                 
24 In the language of production functions, these tax base features can be identified either as productive 
inputs or components of the "residual", in the spirit of Denison, in a TD production function. Production 
functions of tax administrations are examined or described in Lasheras and Herrera (1991),  Bagchi, Bird 
and Das-Gupta (1995), Hunter and Nelson (1996),  Das-Gupta and Ghosh and Mookherjee (2004) and 
Bird (forthcoming).  
25 Earlier cross-country evidence on collection costs, though not of scale economies, is in Lasheras and 
Herrera (1991) and Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998). The former present data on 10 member countries 
of The Inter-American Association of Tax Administrations (CIAT) while the latter present data on 19 
countries from different sources.  
26 Even these data are not fully comparable: Though all states follow the same modified cash accounting 
system and though major accounting heads are common to all states, local minor heads variations exist. 
The data used here, on "expenditure on collection of taxes and duties" , are taken from the World Bank 
which, in turn, are taken from Annual Financial Statements of states. Permission from the World Bank to 
use the data is gratefully acknowledged. For Maharashtra, data have been "cleaned" using government of 
Maharashtra data to remove some transfers to reserve funds booked under the account head. Regarding 
tax structures, four taxes, the sales tax, stamp duties and registration fees, state excises on liquor and 
motor vehicle taxes contributed between 72.3 and 99.4 of own tax revenue in different years during this 
period, with a mean of  90.4 and a coefficient of variation of 0.07. 
27 A simple double-log regression has an R-squared of 0.26. This rises to 0.99 on either including other 
hypothesized determinants or on using weighted least squares and a first order autoregressive error 
specification. 
28 An additional variable, the share of central government transfers to states in their total revenue, proved to 
be highly significant in most cases, suggesting a negative impact of transfers on state tax collection 
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 The implications for tax design, if these results can be generalized, is that 
jurisdictions with higher per capita income will find it less costly to collect a greater 
proportion of their taxes from income taxes and other direct taxes. In terms of reform, 
moving to greater reliance on direct taxes with development is likely to be cost efficient. 
This broadly accords with cross-country evidence on actual tax structures.29 
Proposition 8: TA costs increase with complex tax bases. 
 A precise definition of "complex tax bases" being elusive, a practically useful 
general discussion is difficult to provide and only brief remarks are made here.30 
Nevertheless, some cost increasing features which contribute to complexity figure in the 
propositions discussed below, with respect to multiple tax entities, international tax bases 
and non-revenue objectives. Several tax design features leading to complexity are widely 
accepted and most of these features require more information.31 In practice, tax provisions 
having one or more of the following properties can be conjectured to contribute to 
complexity: (a) they involve greater than average expenditure by the TA  (not just the TD) 
per unit of tax revenue; (b) they lead to frequent tax disputes; (c) the number of pages of tax 
law, including administrative law and judicial rulings, devoted to qualifications, exceptions 
or computational instructions is high; and (d) only tax law experts fully understand the 
provision. Among specific tax design features that are likely to contribute to complexity: 
Values (which require both prices and quantities) rather than quantities alone; bases for 
which a greater number of dates and locations of different events is needed for tax 
                                                                                                                                                 
effort, as reflected in cost efficiency. This is similar to findings for some other countries though the 
specific channel through TD collection efficiency has not been previously noticed.  
29 An OLS regression of the (log) share of "income, profits and capital gains taxes" in total taxes on (log) 
GDP per capita and dummy variables for oil producing and transition economies, using data on 101 
countries from the World Bank's World Development Indicators for 2001, has a positive coefficient, 
significant at 99% but an R-squared of only 0.288. This is similar to findings of earlier cross-country tax 
structure studies. Earlier work is in Hinrichs (1966), Bahl (1971), Chelliah et. al. (1975), Tait et. al 
(1979), Tanzi (1992) and Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998). 
30 Discussions of complexity are in McClure (1989), Glassberg and Smyth (1995), Kaplow (1996), Slemrod 
and Bakija (1996), and James, Sawyer and Wallschutzky (1997). According to Bagchi, Bird and Das-
Gupta (1995): "Complexity refers to the possibility of the base being wrongly estimated even if all 
components are fully observable". They point to the measurement of complexity as an important task for 
research. A recent attempt by Gale and Holtzblatt (2002), who define complexity as the total resource cost of 
the tax system, partly following an earlier suggestion of Joel Slemrod, is unsatisfactory, as it assumes as true 
the hypothesis that complexity, and complexity alone, leads to high costs. 
31 For example, McClure (1989) identifies five causes of income tax complexity: (a) rules to precisely define 
real economic income; (b) tax expenditure clauses; (c) provisions to counter abuse of tax concessions or 
resulting inequity; (d) rules covering the transition between existing and new provisions; and (e) a general 
lack of logical coherence of the tax law. 
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determination; and bases for which a greater number of entities from whom or about whom 
information is needed for tax determination.   
Proposition 9: TD Costs increase with the number and variety of taxable entities. 
 The number of types of entities subject to different taxes, particularly the income 
tax, tends to be large. Entities are distinguished by residency status, ownership, whether 
they are incorporated or not, profit or not-for-profit organizations, by the nature of their 
economic activity (financial sector, trade, production, real estate), by the amount of the 
tax base in their hands (large taxpayer, small business) and so on. To some extent this is 
inevitable in modern economies, despite equity violations and the scope for tax avoidance 
this creates. Nevertheless, since types of information for tax determination by the TD 
typically differ across entities, sometimes because tax design provisions are tailored for 
particular entities, this increases TD costs. A possible exception to this, especially in low 
capacity TDs, is targeting TD effort to assess large taxpayers.32 
The obvious implication for tax design is to reduce the number of tax entities recognized 
or treated differently in the tax law, though this rule is difficult to apply in practice, 
especially where more than one tax jurisdiction is involved. 
Proposition 10: TD capacity in closed economies increases with financial development 
 The extent of adoption of modern accounting methods by business and the extent 
of use of modern, bank mediated, payment mechanisms (cheques, book-transfers and 
credit cards) is of importance to the TD. With modern payment technology transactions 
leave an "audit trail" which permits easier detection and verification of payments in tax 
investigations by the TD. To encourage adoption of modern accounting and cheque 
usage, particularly among small traders, taxpayer education and even a cost-based 
deduction from taxes, could be considered. 
 On the other hand, as Slemrod (1990) points out, sophisticated financial systems 
coupled with openness increase the ease with which funds may cross international 
borders to escape taxes (discussed further below).  
                                                 
32 For example, see Baer (2002). As usual "the devil is in the details": A caveat to this exception is that the 
reported tax base of a taxpayer is not the correct criterion to identify large taxpayers: as with 
presumptive taxes, characteristics which are easy for the TD to observe and which are hard for the 
taxpayer to manipulate should instead be used. See Das-Gupta, Ghosh and Mookherjee (2004). 
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 Both these observations suggest that appropriate tax designs at different levels of 
financial development and openness differ. To repeat a now familiar point, design 
solutions should take account of differences in information availability and economies for 
the TD. 
Proposition 11: It is efficient for countries with low literacy levels and underdeveloped 
accounting professions to rely relatively more on commodity taxes. 
 That reliance on commodity taxes, particularly on international trade in goods 
(though not services), tends to vary inversely with per capita GDP is a well known 
empirical regularity. That this is due to the relative ease with which goods can be taxed, 
particularly at national borders, is also widely accepted. This is well illustrated by 
customs administration, where border checks continue to be of importance.33 In contrast, 
income and value added are intrinsically accounting concepts, especially where there are 
both receipts and expenses and where these are subject to timing differences. Second, 
with sales or other payment transactions between citizens that affect tax bases, the 
information available to the TD from the payment technology in use becomes important. 
Direct cash or barter payments which do not involve third parties are difficult for a TD to 
detect. Goods production and sales are least affected by this information constraint.34 As 
countries develop, to move smoothly to greater reliance on income taxes, and also the 
VAT, it is useful for them to focus on developing accountancy capacity and modern 
payments channels. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 This advice is to be found in the context of the VAT by Ebrill et. al. (2001). For example, the removal of 
border checks in the European Union has resulted in falling VAT revenue from cross-border goods sales 
(Chang Woon Nam et. al. 2003). For discussion of the case of India, see Das-Gupta (2003). 
34 Physical asset sales and ownership also fall into this category. Property and asset taxes are of limited 
importance in most countries, except for local government finance and some city states (Hong Kong, 
Singapore) where they can be a major source of revenue. Why an economically efficient base like 
immobile land is not more heavily taxed is not a question which this paper is competent to deal with. 
Furthermore, while the logic of the argument being presented here would apply to property and asset 
taxes, it is difficult to conclude that increased reliance on property taxes is possible or desirable without 
taking into account alternative potential sources of local government finance. This issue is not pursued 
further here.  
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3.5 Information access and the law 
Proposition 12:  TD effectiveness decreases with restricted access to information 
(including privacy laws) 
 This point is made in Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995) who also provide a brief 
review of restrictions on TD access to information in different countries and their link 
with widely recognized human rights. As with many of the propositions in the paper, 
rigorous theoretical analysis and empirical evidence is still lacking on the impact of 
restricted information access of different kinds. Restrictions apply particularly to 
financial information from banks and for information that can only be discovered by 
searches of persons or private records by the TD. Relaxation of privacy laws to increase 
TD access has costs via violation of  basic human rights and possibly reduced 
effectiveness of financial intermediation.35 The implication for tax design is that financial 
transactions involving banks, unrecorded assets, and transactions involving difficult to 
verify expenses (e.g. business entertainment) or receipts by individuals or firms should 
either be excluded from the tax base, or taxed or allowed as deductions using 
presumptions. 
 With increased information technology and particularly internet penetration, 
financial development and adoption of modern accounting, information once considered 
private is increasingly becomes publicly available. So, once again, the efficient tax base 
will vary with these characteristics of financial development and adoption of information 
technology. In terms of the tax mix, indirect taxes particularly on cross-border 
transactions, typically rely less on private information to verify tax compliance and so 
should be relied on relatively more when privacy laws impede TD effectiveness in 
collecting income taxes. 
Proposition 13: TD costs increase and effectiveness decreases with stringent evidence 
standards 
 Related to the previous proposition is the question of standards of evidence. The 
quality and sufficiency of evidence required by a TD to establish non-compliance is 
                                                 
35 For a recent discussion of these issues in the context of tax information exchange treaties see Zagaris 
(2003). 
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determined by standards of evidence applicable to tax matters in a country.36 This can 
range, in legal terminology,  between "preponderance of probability" usually adopted in 
civil cases to "beyond reasonable doubt" applicable in capital crimes. Furthermore, 
whether the burden of proof is on the TD ("innocent until proven guilty") or on the 
taxpayer ("guilty until proven innocent") is also relevant for TD costs. Presumptions and 
presumptive taxes are an extreme example of relaxation of evidence standards. Low 
standards of evidence increase the likelihood of taxes being only imperfectly related to 
the designed tax base, and tax offences being only imperfectly related to tax sanctions.37  
 The first general tax design issue of what standards of evidence are appropriate 
and feasible in different countries given social preferences and the capacity of courts. 
This will directly affect the revenue potential of the tax system via its impact on TD 
effectiveness. The second issue is for penalty design which, in turn, depends on the extent 
to which societies are willing to tolerate wrongful punishment versus letting tax offenders 
go free.  
3.6 Information and TA organization 
Proposition 14:  TA costs can decrease with selective tax farming and outsourcing. 
 There are a wide variety of TD functions which can be privatized or outsourced, 
ranging from producing tax forms, to mandatory financial audits, to tax withholding, to 
semi-autonomous revenue boards to outright tax farming. Even self-assessment of taxes 
can be viewed as a form of outsourcing. In terms of tax design, two examples can be 
given to illustrate the potential for selective privatization to increase TA efficiency or 
even economic welfare, while giving rise to changed tax designs. 
 Changing the taxable entity to groups of taxpayers: Such a scheme has been 
proposed by Ueng and Yang (2000). In the first stage of their scheme, the TD makes a 
tax demand from a group of taxpayers based on what it knows about the aggregate tax 
base of the group, leaving contributions by members to be decided within the group. 
                                                 
36 See Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995), Bird (forthcoming) and, for the VAT, Das-Gupta and Gang 
(2003). 
37 In case of non-compliance, a Type I error is where a tax offender remains uncaught and a Type II error is 
where a taxpayer is incorrectly found guilty of a tax offence. Holding constant TD capacity, low 
standards of evidence increase the incidence of Type II error and stringent standards increase Type I 
error. The possibility of error is one resolution to the Becker paradox of low penalty rates proposed in 
the literature (Bolton, 1996, Boadway and Sato, 2000). 
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Normal tax assessment and procedures are adopted towards group members by the TD if 
the group fails to meet the tax demanded by the TD. In their framework, TA effectiveness 
is increased and the excess burden of tax evasion and taxation is eliminated. 
Unfortunately, such a scheme may have costs in practice, since within-group coercion is 
assumed away and the TD's ability to determine taxes in the second stage is assumed to 
be unimpaired by their lack of knowledge about group members in the first stage. 
Clearly, both assumptions lack realism, the first in some cases, the second in almost all 
cases. 
 Nevertheless the authors give examples of where similar tax farming variants 
have been used. To take a related example from non-tax revenue in India, irrigation 
charges are recovered in the states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh through local 
Water Users Associations of farmers, with irrigation departments only billing the entire 
group. Since association members together have information from direct observation of 
water use by members, this economizes on additional information needed to assess dues. 
Furthermore, since associations retain a substantial proportion of dues they collect, for 
maintenance of local irrigation works and other expenses, they also have the incentive to 
collect dues. 
 Substituting auction revenue for excise duty on liquor in India: Several states in 
India periodically auction local monopoly rights to sell liquor at the retail level instead of 
levying an excise tax on producers. This can be viewed as a variant of tax farming. The 
arrangement reduces TD and TA costs, and increases TA effectiveness. Revenue from 
auctions is also among the most buoyant state revenue sources. Furthermore, efficiency 
loss from conferring local monopoly rights is not a major issue given that a commodity 
considered socially undesirable is involved.  
 Complete privatization of collection of major taxes is clearly not a desirable 
option, given the potential for harassment and over-assessment of taxes by private 
agents.38 Nevertheless, all modern tax systems involve privatization to some degree, via 
tax withholders, banks as tax collection agents, and in several countries, semi-
autonomous revenue authorities.39 The general principle is to privatize or outsource 
                                                 
38 A general discussion is in Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995). See also Ramirez Acuna (1992).  
39 Discussion of revenue authorities is in Jenkins (1994), Devas, et. al. (2000) and Talierco (2003). 
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activities whenever the social costs of doing so, due partly to information economies but 
also due to collection incentives of the TD versus private agents, are less than the cost of 
the TD carrying out the activity directly.40 
3.7 Tax information and globalization 
Proposition 15:  Globally mobile tax bases and entities reduce TD effectiveness. 
 This problem is becoming increasingly serious with globalization. Key areas 
where cross-border mobility erodes national tax bases include globalization of financial 
asset markets, multinational corporations, footloose industries, international outsourcing, 
skilled labour mobility, tax havens and off-shore banking.41  
 Globalization of financial asset markets facilitates evasion or avoidance of 
interest, dividend income and capital gains taxation.  An instructive case of the impact of 
mobile financial savings on tax design is the German interest tax withholding reform in 
1991.42 A 10 percent withholding tax on interest income introduced in 1991 to curb an 
estimated 80 percent tax evasion rate, led to a massive outflow of saving and even more 
evasion. Following a Constitutional Court of Germany ruling, a substantial annual 
allowance was introduced for interest income. In effect, Germany tacitly admitted its 
inability to tax this mobile base and introduced a base narrowing tax amendment so as 
not to decrease the domestic availability of savings. Several countries have, for similar 
reasons, exempted capital gains and some have extended this to dividends.43 
                                                 
40 See Toma and Toma (1991). An important issue in outsourcing is the nature of the contract signed 
between the government and the private agent. A general survey of contract forms is in McAfee and 
McMillan (1987). For tax farming, the issue is discussed briefly by Toma and Toma (1991). The 
importance of contract forms in practice is discussed for private pre-shipment inspection services for 
customs administration by Low (1995). Though not directly related to tax design, the contract form is 
crucial and largely determines government and social benefits from out-sourcing, both in theory and 
practice. For related analysis, see Mookherjee and Png (1995), Mookherjee (1997) and Wane (2000). 
41 Increased tax competition, another consequence of globalization, does not directly involve tax 
administration issues. There is a large body of writing on the subject. Owen (1993), Tanzi and Zee 
(2000), Lodin (2002), Dwyer (2002) and Zagaris (2001, 2003) are samples. The discussion of issues that 
do concern this paper also draws largely on these papers. 
42 This discussion is based on Lodin (2002). 
43 Three common tax avoidance practices are "double dipping" through different characterizations of cross-
border transactions in jurisdictions involved, exploiting differences in entity characterization in host and 
home countries, and exploiting differences in tax accounting rules in host and home countries. These 
can, to an extent, be reduced by harmonizing tax laws. See Asian Development Bank Institute (2001). 
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 The taxation problems associated with transfer pricing by multinational 
corporations, and continuing international attempts to deal with this issue via legislation 
based on multilateral models, are widely written about and not discussed here.44 
 Footloose industries, international outsourcing and mobile skilled labour result in 
tax base erosion under existing tax rules which base taxability on residence rather than 
nationality (the United States being a major exception). Countries which have nationality 
rather than residence based tax bases must contend with tax evasion and avoidance, 
which TDs generally find hard to cope with. Several countries have capitulated and 
introduced lenient tax regimes so as not do drive productive resources away.  
 By incorporating in a tax haven jurisdiction, or routing transactions through shell 
entities resident in havens, businesses seek to escape national taxes of their "true" home 
country.45  Dealing with tax havens both unilaterally and via multilateral action is 
emerging as a major battle ground to protect domestic tax bases.46 So far, despite some 
progress, the advantage appears to be with tax havens.  
 There are four important implications of these developments for tax design. First, 
administratively feasible taxation of capital income and also earnings of mobile labour 
and production will increasingly have to be source rather than residence based. Second, 
final withholding taxes on interest, dividends and other payments to mobile factors are 
increasingly being seen as least cost.47 Third, cooperative tax harmonization will reduce 
the incentive for cross-border flows.48 Nevertheless, fourth, given that not all countries 
have the incentive to enter into tax harmonization agreements – particularly tax havens – 
concessional tax rates relative to immobile factors may be inevitable. Inequity in the 
taxation of mobile and immobile factors and other entities is likely to persist and further 
base erosion with increasing globalization can be expected. 
                                                 
44 See, for example, Owens (1993), Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995) and references cited there, and 
Muten (2002). 
45 Tax havens and off-shore financial centres also facilitate financing and profiting from criminal and 
terrorist activity and weaken national policing and control efforts. 
46 Among the important responses are unilateral Controlled Financial Corporation (CFC) legislation 
pioneered by the USA, common definitions of "harmful tax competition" and codes of conduct or 
multilateral action, even coercive action, against tax havens, multilateral guidelines for transparent 
financial reporting by offshore banks, information exchange or tax collection agreements. See Zagaris 
(2001, 2003), Lodin (2002) and Muten (2002). 
47 Zee (1998) and Lodin (2002). 
48 For the inevitable argument against tax harmonization, this time from theory, see Cremer and Gavhari 
(2000). Also see Fuest and Huber (2001). 
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Proposition 16:  E-commerce reduces TD effectiveness 
 E-commerce, since it need not leave paper trails, decreases the accessibility of 
enforcement information TDs have access to in cross-border transactions. The 
information problem is most serious for cross border sales to final consumers.49 
Nevertheless, only the volume of such transactions is growing and no new issues, relative 
to, say, mail order sales arise.50 
 To cope with TD ineffectiveness, source and residence definitions and may have 
to be refined to take account of areas of ambiguity. Without far grater violation of privacy 
than exists today, systematic taxation of direct sales to final consumers is unlikely to be 
possible. 
Proposition 17: TD effectiveness increases with inter-jurisdiction information sharing 
and cooperation 
 This is a major area of institution building to increase TD and tax system 
effectiveness in the face of globalization. However, given opposing incentives in 
different countries, globalization is still likely to cause diminished TD effectiveness. 
Furthermore, while there are exceptions, particularly in the Americas, cooperation 
between developing countries is at a lower stage than between developed countries.  
 Cooperation and information sharing are greatly facilitated by common tax 
definitions (of the definition of types of income and other receipts, taxable entities, 
residence, permanent establishment, sale, and so on).51 In addition avoidance 
opportunities are reduced with common tax periods and timing of tax obligations. 
Therefore, besides tax rate and base harmonization to reduce the incentive for cross-
border tax avoidance and evasion, cooperative harmonization of basic tax law categories 
is of importance. 
 Not all information cooperation areas relate to sophisticated tax transactions: One 
basic area of cooperation is to protect tax revenues from leakages associated with cross-
                                                 
49 Asian Development Bank Institute (2001) and Lodin (2002). 
50 The major tax design problem arises with apportioning the potential tax base and establishing  the 
jurisdiction which has the right to tax a particular sale or income under either existing source or 
residence rules (Lodin, 2002). An example from Peha and Strauss (1997) illustrates this: If a doctor from 
the US gives advice via the internet to a medical team in the UK while on vacation in the Bahamas, 
where did the transaction take place? 
51 Though the main purpose of bilateral tax treaties is to avoid double taxation of income, they help to bring 
about uniformity of  terminology. Furthermore, many treaties also have information exchange clauses. 
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border trade in goods. Information exchange between customs authorities on both 
outbound and inbound shipments (or the possibly less effective alternative of private pre-
shipment inspection) can help curb evasion not only of trade taxes but also of the sales 
tax or VAT. The case of the VAT in the European Union (EU), however, suggests that it 
is important to distinguish among different types of information in exchange agreements. 
Using the EU's VAT Information Exchange System (VIES), member countries exchange 
domestic, tax return and tax invoice based, records of cross-border VAT sales. The 
system was put in place just prior to removal of physical border checks between member 
countries in 1993. VIES has not been able to substitute for border-checks. The lesson 
suggested is that substituting exchange of information of poor quality (i.e. accounts based 
information – given the benefit of hind-sight) for good quality information (from border 
checks and control procedures) may not help increase TD effectiveness.52 
 What does this have to do with tax  design? The discussion in Chang Woon Nam 
et. al. (2003) points to (a) the weakness of the current, primarily destination based VAT 
due to abuse of zero-rating of exports but (2) the difficulty in moving to a destination 
based VAT but with tax collection on the basis of origin as planned. This is due to 
incentives stemming from the likely change in the shares of different countries in VAT 
revenue given differing evasion rates. So the planned clearing house mechanism whereby 
countries collect the VAT on behalf of other members and then redistribute revenues on 
the basis of destination is being resisted by some member countries. At present, due to 
these administrative problems, continuation of the present system with re-introduction of 
border controls appears to be the only way to combat VAT evasion: But this would be a 
retrograde step in setting up a single market within the EU.53 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 For a description of the VIES see Hutchison (1996) and European Union (2002). Chang Woon Nam, 
et.al. (2003) estimate VAT evasion in the EU. For general conclusions of the desirability of border 
controls, despite their trade impedicng costs, see Ebrill et. al. (2001). 
53 For discussion of clearing house mechanisms and alternatives see Ebrill et. al. (2001), including 
references to a debate in International Tax and Public Finance (2000). 
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3.8 Tax information and non-revenue objectives 
Proposition 18: TA costs increase if the tax system is used as an instrument to achieve 
non-revenue objectives. 
 This has already been referred to above and is widely accepted. Tax concessions 
are possibly the major cause of tax base narrowing. Besides redistribution, investment 
and saving incentives are most common in tax design,54 though there is a long list of 
other non-revenue objectives that tax systems have been used for. More than generally 
applicable tax provisions, exemptions or concessions for specific groups of taxable 
entities (end-user provisions) are not uncommon.  
 Besides base-narrowing, reduced equity, and price distortions, differential 
treatment of entities greatly increases TA information requirements, increases 
opportunities for misreporting and complicates tax compliance requirements on taxpayers 
and third parties. In particular, TD costs can greatly increase if there are new types of 
activities that have to be verified to ascertain eligibility for concessions: Examples are 
investment allowances for setting up production units in remote, backward areas, export 
incentives (requiring information for verification from other countries), installation and 
use of pollution control equipment and tax relief related to the duration or severity of 
disabilities. In such cases, concessions often end up being poorly targeted and abused: 
The social return to tax revenue foregone can be low and, at the margin even zero.55 
 It is also important to note that the MECF of other tax instruments, say changing 
tax rates or an efficiency enhancing reform in TD enforcement procedures, will increase 
on account of the greater leakage due to tax concessions. 
 The lesson is clear: Use tax concessions for non-revenue objectives very 
selectively and only after comparing their effectiveness with alternative, 
expenditure/subsidy or regulatory instruments which can potentially serve the same 
objectives. 
 
                                                 
54 An extensive analysis with several country studies is in Shah (1995), though administrative aspects are 
given limited attention. The studies also provide a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of 
different types of tax incentives such as tax holidays versus investment allowances. 
55 Se for, example, Tanzi and Zee (2000) For a recent Indian example, see Rajaraman et. al. (1999). 
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3.9 Tax rates and compliance incentives 
Proposition 19: High marginal and average rates of tax decrease TD effectiveness. 
 As discussed, this is an important justification for broad based taxes. This is one 
proposition for which there is a wealth of empirical evidence and some theoretical 
support.56 Though the evidence suggests a negative relation between tax rates and either 
compliance or revenue, this has a direct implication for TD effectiveness since one of two 
important dimensions of TD effectiveness are reflected in the tax gap.  
 Clearly, lower tax rates must ultimately result in low revenue as tax rates move 
into the positively sloped region of the Laffer curve, so the implied tax design lesson is 
for moderate rather than zero tax rates!  
 Five remarks are needed to impart greater precision to this design suggestion. 
First, tax rates here refer to effective tax rates, taking into account tax concessions, 
exclusions and the timing of tax payments. Second, both high average and high marginal 
tax rates for taxpayers have been found to have negative effects on tax revenue and TD 
effectiveness. Third, however, whether low expected effective tax rates, taking into 
account the extent of tax evasion and the TD's ability to detect evasion and impose 
penalties, or low effective tax rates per se – that would apply to honest taxpayers – 
increase TD effectiveness, requires further empirical investigation.57 Nevertheless, since 
low effective rates of tax reduce the tax burden of all taxpayers, honest or dishonest, 
these are advisable. Fourth, when combined with the advice to reduce exemptions and 
concessions, this amounts to suggesting low nominal tax rates. Fifth, lowering tax rates, 
as with most tax structure reforms discussed here, should form part of a package of 
reforms. For example, as emphasized by Alm, Bahl and Murray (1990), lowering 
marginal tax rates in the Jamaican case examined by them without simultaneously 
strengthening the TD could result in lower revenue – despite increased TD effectiveness. 
                                                 
56 For example, empirical evidence is in Clotfelter (1983), Alm, Bahl and Murray (1990, 1991), Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez (1992), Das-Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee (1995), Joulfaian and Rider (1998) and all 
nine papers surveyed in De Juan, Lasheras and Mayo (1994). While the basic tax evasion model of 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts a positive relation between tax rates and tax revenue with 
penalties proportional to evaded taxes (Yitzhaki, 1974), extensions to allow leakage of the tax base 
weaken the relation allowing for a "Laffer curve" response. 
57 The analysis in Marelli (1982) suggests low effective rates for risk averse taxpayers but low expected 
rates for risk neutral taxpayers. 
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 The discussion here leaves open the question of what moderate tax rates, which 
would maximize TD effectiveness and revenues are. Unfortunately, the no OSFA rule 
applies to this and there is little information even in cases where systematic empirical 
work is available.58 Relevant factors include tax rate effects on economic activity in 
different economies, the size of the informal sector, the extent of tax withholding and 
many more. A "seat-of-pants" range for marginal tax rates of a broad- based personal 
income tax is between 15% and 35% and between 5% and 20% for a broad based VAT. 
Proposition 20: In the presence of tax evasion redistribution as a goal of the tax system 
should optimally be given less weight.  
 This is the prescription emerging from a number of recent papers on optimal tax 
theory, which incorporate tax evasion.59  When the TD can commit to an audit strategy in 
advance, these papers find that the optimal, redistributive, income tax structure is 
influenced by auditing effectiveness. The broad result is that income taxes should 
optimally be regressive.60 Though these papers are still too abstract to serve as complete 
guides to policy, for practical tax design a conservative lesson appears warranted, even at 
this stage of knowledge: Highly progressive income taxes should not be advocated: 
besides increasing evasion incentives and reducing TD effectiveness, they are not optimal 
even from the point of view of redistribution and economic efficiency.  
Proposition 21: In a low capacity TD, effectiveness may not increase either with ad 
valorem or specific tax rates on goods. 
 Ad valorem taxes on commodities have the potential advantage of being linked to 
sales value and so are inflation proof and elastic with respect to demand increases. 
Specific taxes, on the other hand economise on the information needed for base 
determination and so are considered harder to evade. Both these hypotheses are 
appealing, but need not hold good in practice as the following example shows.  
                                                 
58 For example, Alm, Bahl and Murray (1991) report simulations to determine individual income tax rates 
for Jamaica, but not the results. Das-Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee (1995), report results of small 
perturbations but do not examine large changes in tax rates. 
59 See Cremer and Gavhari (1996), Chander and Wilde (1998) and also Boadway and Sato (2000). The 
relation to tax administration is direct: Tax evasion can only occur if a TD is unable or unwilling to 
eradicate tax evasion. 
60 Furthermore, Cremer and Gavhari (1996) find that a result of earlier general income tax models without 
tax evasion, that the top marginal tax rate should be zero at a high enough income level, continues to 
hold. 
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
 
28
 The state of Maharashtra in India switched over from a regime of specific excise 
duties on liquor production to an ad valorem regime in 1997. Under this "MRP" (a ceiling 
or Maximum Retail Price) system, excise duty and MRP are fixed as a multiple of the 
cost of production declared by distilleries and breweries to the Maharashtra Excise 
Department. Specific floor rates are also fixed for different categories of liquor. The 
MRP is required to be printed along with the production batch number on all liquor bottle 
labels and cases. The MRP system led to an immediate increase in excise duty collection 
which was, however, quickly eroded. Table 2 shows that this increase was eroded even in 
unit terms, with duty as a percentage of the wholesale price returning to its pre-reform 
level for two categories within 1 to 5 years and showing a downward trend for the third.  
 
Table 2: The Impact of Maharashtra's Switch from specific to ad valorem excise duties 
on liquor in 1997 
 1996-97 
(Pre 
reform) 
1997-98 1998-00 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 
Unit realization of excise duty (Rupees per bulk litre of sale) 
"Indian Made Foreign 
Liquor" 
72.63 136.91 131.48 123.43 115.30 101.47 
"Country Liquor" 42.88 44.27 45.39 39.81 33.91 29.49 
Beer 11.30 20.58 21.56 18.50 19.90 16.87 
Index of excise unit realization to All India Wholesale Price Index by product category 
(1996-97 = 100) 
"Indian Made Foreign 
Liquor" 
100.0 175.6 156.6 136.3 122.6 100.4 
Country Liquor 100.0 100.4 98.9 86.1 77.8 72.0 
Beer 100.0 164.5 156.4 126.9 134.5 114.1 
Data sources: Excise Department, Government of Maharashtra, except Wholesale Price Index: Centre for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy. 
 
 This example suggests a negative lesson for tax design: rate (and base) reform, 
specifically the choice between ad valorem and specific tax rates, may not lead to 
revenue gains if the TD is unable or unwilling to enforce these rates. 
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Proposition 22: TA effectiveness is increased if, without greatly increased complexity, 
tax design and procedures take money amounts as equivalent if they are equal in 
present value terms. 
 Tax design provisions to prevent inflationary revenue loss are well known and not 
examined in detail here.61 The essential principles in highly inflationary situations 
involve shortening the tax period and ensuring, to the extent possible, that tax laws 
specify dues in present value terms, that is, include interest provisions. In practice, 
inflation proofing increases the complexity of the tax code and taxpayer compliance 
costs, establishing a trade-off between revenue and both economic efficiency costs and 
TA costs. Thus, the extent of inflation proofing that is advisable will depend on taxpayer 
sophistication and the rate of inflation, and no OSFA rule is available.62,63 
Proposition 23:  TA costs decrease with well designed (effective) penalties 
 One puzzle is why practical tax designs pay so little attention to the design of 
penalties for tax non-compliance. A wide ranging discussion of good penalty design is in 
Oldman (1965). As Bird (forthcoming) puts it: 
 "Experience suggests that penalties should increase with (1) the potential revenue 
loss due to the tax offence; (2) the difficulty and cost of detecting the offence; (3) the 
effect of the offence on other taxpayers; (4) the offender’s state of mind (a higher penalty 
should apply if the offence is deliberate and pre-planned); and (5) recidivism." 
Other desirable design features of penalties are: 
a. In elaboration of Bird's first principle, penalties for lesser degrees of non-
compliance should, following the principle of marginal deterrence, be less than 
the marginal social loss so that taxpayers have the incentive to substitute away 
from higher levels of non-compliance (Mookherjee and Png, 1994).  
                                                 
61 For example, see Casanegre de Jantscher (1992) and Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995). 
62 Bird (forthcoming) views 30 to 35 percent inflation per year as high. 
63 An example from India illustrates how conceptually simple present value adjustments can be viewed as 
complex by taxpayers even if they are beneficial to the taxpayer: Long term capital gains in India were 
required to be computed as S – P(CS/CP), where S is the sale price in rupees, P is the purchase price in 
rupees and CS and CP are "Cost Inflation Indices" announced for each year in a year-end notification 
(these merely reproduces a Consumer Price Index) by the Income Tax Department. CS is for the year of 
sale and CP for the year of purchase. This "complicated" system was recently reviewed by an expert 
committee and reformed.  
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b. Penalties for "technical offences" with no direct revenue impact, such as a 
failure to keep mandatory records or provide information to the TD, should be 
high enough to reflect both the direct and indirect revenue impact (Das-Gupta 
and Mookherjee, 1998).  
c. Non-monetary penalties, including garnishment, closing of business 
establishments, public shame and even jail sentences should be selectively 
employed if culturally permissible.64 
d. The procedure for levy of penalty should be transparent and not subject to TD 
discretion.  
e. Penalties for corruption or inaction by bureaucrats should be high enough to 
reduce opportunities for non-compliant taxpayers ("gainers") to compensate 
bureaucrats who are punished ("losers"). 
Proposition 24: Well designed penalties may include negative penalties65   
 If, after a tax audit by the TD, no non-compliance is detected, then a negative 
penalty has been found to be optimal in the literature on optimal income taxes. To be 
practically implementable a precondition must be met: It should be difficult for auditors 
to falsify the results of audits: else greater bribes and revenue loss will result from 
negative penalties.  
Proposition 25: Well designed penalties should not be too high – or revenue may 
decrease via tax avoidance.  
 This empirical finding in the case of Jamaica by Alm, Bahl and Murray (1990), 
complements the optimal tax literature which finds non-maximal penalties in the 
presence of taxpayer and TD mistakes to be optimal (footnote 37). 
Further empirical research is required before it will be possible for the exact structure and 
numerical levels of penalties, as opposed to qualitative results, to draw on  existing 
research.66 
                                                 
64 Fir an analysis of jail sentences in tax cases see Chu and Jiang (1993), Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and 
also Garoupa and Gomez-Powar (2000). 
65 Mookherjee and Png (1989), Cremer and Gavhari (1996), Chander and Wilde (1998) and Boadway and 
Sato (2000). 
66 Empirical results (reviewed in Andreoni, et. al., 1998) suggest that existing penalties do deter non-
compliance. However, discouraging experimental results on the deterrent effect of existing levels of 
Implications of Tax Administration for 
Tax Design: A Tentative Assessment 
 
31
3.10 The magnitude of TA costs 
Proposition 26: TD and TA Costs are not accurately measured – even in principle 
 First consider TD costs. Since government expenditure accounting in developing 
countries and also many developed countries is cash based, and since there is seldom a 
system of user charges by one department for goods (e.g. buildings constructed or occupied) 
or services (e.g. police protection or judicial proceedings, audit services of the government 
audit, tax legislation by law departments) provided to other departments, true resource costs 
of the TD are not captured by government budgets. This is exacerbated by non-market 
values used to value government assets or asset rentals. 
 For TA costs, it is probably fair to say that the cost of collecting taxes has not been 
adequately conceptualised. For example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) identify five 
component costs of taxation. They are administrative (TD) costs, deadweight efficiency 
loss from taxation, the excess burden of tax evasion, avoidance and compliance costs of 
taxpayers. The latter is a part of TA costs. Even if these cost components are defined as 
inclusively as possible, the classification at least omits the cost of tax policy institutions, 
tax education and research. In addition, it should be noted that some activities within a 
tax system may have offsetting benefits so that net cost may differ from gross costs. 
The implications for tax policy are firstly, that comparison of different tax design options 
will, for the time being, continue to be based on experience and seat-of-pants reasoning 
which may fail to take account of true TA costs.67 To improve cost estimates, at least for 
the TD, reform of government accounting is needed, a difficult reform to implement in 
many developing countries. For example, the move to accrual accounting and partial 
inter-department charging in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom helps 
improve the accuracy of TD cost estimates. 
Proposition 27: TD costs are substitutes for private sector costs: Measured TD costs are 
just the tip of the iceberg. 
 Estimates suggest that despite probably understated TD costs due to current 
government accounting conventions, taxpayer and third party compliance costs are much 
                                                                                                                                                 
penalties has been obtained by Alm, McKee and Jackson (1992). A theoretical result on the limited 
deterrent impact of penalties on the hard-to-tax is in Das-Gupta (1994). 
67 This is also true of excess burden costs as discussed by Feldstein (1997). 
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higher, in some estimates by a factor of 10 to 15, even in developed countries. And these 
are total costs, not costs at the margin.68 
 For example, Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) estimate the compliance cost of 
small and mid-sized business in the United States at around 27 to 28 percent of taxes paid 
by them, which are around 10 times as high as the compliance cost of large firms with the 
corporation income tax reported in Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996).69 In contrast, the 
cost of collection of taxes by the United States Internal Revenue Service is under 2 
percent of taxes collected. For India, recent estimates put the compliance cost of the 
corporation income tax at between 5.6 percent and 14.5 percent of corporation tax 
collection compared to imputed administration costs for the corporation income tax of the 
Indian Income Tax Department of below 1 percent of tax collected. For the individual 
income tax, Slemrod and Sorum (1984) estimate the compliance costs at between 5 to 7 
percent of taxes.70 Indian tax compliance costs of taxpayers and third parties are 
estimated, though with a small sample, at a massive 57 percent of taxes compared to 
administration costs of 2.5 percent. Both in the United States and India compliance costs 
were found to be regressive for individuals and businesses. Costs were substantially 
higher for the self-employed, with private compliance costs often exceeding taxes paid in 
the Indian estimates.71 
                                                 
68 All compliance cost studies during the past 70 years on which information was found are listed in 
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002, 2002a) along with their main features. Unfortunately, almost all 
studies to date have been for developed countries. 
69 Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) also estimate that US companies with international operations had 
compliance costs 143 percent higher than other US companies, which suggests that TD information 
requirements can act as a hidden cost of openness. It may not be a coincidence that earlier work by 
Joulfaian (1993) finds that firms with foreign operations, specifically links with tax havens,  have 
significantly lower rates of compliance. 
70 Information to express more recent compliance cost estimates for the US in Blumenthal and Slemrod 
(1992) as a percentage of tax paid was not available. 
71 Indian compliance cost estimates are from Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002, 2002a). The impact of 
compliance costs on compliance behaviour of individuals and estimates of non-compliance costs of non-
filers are examined in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002b). Some observations about the estimates 
are in order. The estimates are to be considered preliminary and subject to a large error margin, due to 
small and biased samples owing to non-response. Nevertheless, estimates for individuals were 
deliberately biased downward, to reduce the possibility of overestimation, both for individual responses 
and during aggregation. Various steps taken to do this are described in the studies. Estimates presented 
here net out bribe costs, since these transfers do not involve additional resource costs. Conversely, tax 
deductible compliance expenditures are not netted out. The first two studies also attempt to identify "hot 
spots" or high compliance cost tax provisions and administrative procedures. The estimates do not 
include "psychic" costs of tax complexity, ambiguity and instability to avoid possible double counting. 
These are reported separately. 
